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A MODEL DATA SECURITY AND
BREACH NOTIFICATION STATUTE
MICHAEL BLOOM†
INTRODUCTION
Equifax is one of the three major consumer credit reporting
agencies in the United States.1 On July 29, 2017, Equifax
discovered that hackers had breached its security and potentially
compromised the sensitive information of 143 million American
consumers, including Social Security numbers and driver’s
license numbers.2 Hackers also gained access to names, birth
dates and addresses, as well as credit card numbers for 209,000
consumers.3 A fraud analyst stated that “[o]n a scale of 1 to 10 in
terms of risk to consumers, this is a 10.”4 Another commentator
stated that “[i]t is no exaggeration to suggest that a breach such
as this—exposing highly sensitive personal and financial
information central for identity management and access to
credit—represents a real threat to the economic security of
Americans.”5 This was not the first time that consumer data
stored by Equifax was accessed and acquired by hackers. In
2016, hackers breached W-2 tax and salary data from an Equifax
website, and in 2017, W-2 tax data from an Equifax subsidiary
was stolen.6 Identity thieves can use this stolen data to
“impersonate people with lenders, creditors and service
†
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1
Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Attack Exposes Data of 143 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A1.
2
Id.; WADE BAKER ET AL., VERIZON, 2011 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS
REPORT 31 (2011), https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_databreach-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf (defining hacking as “attempts to
intentionally access or harm information assets without . . . authorization by
thwarting logical security mechanisms”).
3
Bernard et al., supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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providers, who rely on personal identity information from
Equifax to make financial decisions regarding potential
customers.”7
Equifax is far from being the only large corporation to have
substantial amounts of its customers’ sensitive information
compromised. For example, in 2013, a massive hack affected
three billion Yahoo accounts.8 Yahoo did not disclose the breach
to the public until September 2016, stating that data associated
with at least 500 million accounts had been stolen.9 In midDecember 2016, Yahoo disclosed a separate security breach that
also dated back to 2013.10 It was not until October 2017 that
Yahoo finally disclosed that this second 2013 hack affected all
three billion user accounts that existed at the time of the breach,
thus “cement[ing] Yahoo’s place at the top of a long and
ignominious list of massive security breaches.”11
Consumers have been plagued by other high profile data
breaches, including hacks of: (1) Sony Online Entertainment
consumer information of 102 million video game customers, such
as names, addresses, emails, birth dates, and phone numbers of
users;12 (2) a database from Anthem, one of the nation’s largest
health insurers, containing eighty million records of current and
former customers including names, Social Security numbers,
birth dates, addresses, email and employment information, and
income data;13 (3) email addresses and account details for thirtytwo million members of the site Ashley Madison, an

7

Id.
Jethro Mullen & Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Tops the List of Largest Ever Data
Breaches,
CNN
TECH
(Oct.
4,
2017,
5:20
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/04/technology/yahoo-biggest-data-breachesever/index.html.
9
Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Says 500 Million Accounts Stolen, CNN TECH (Sept.
23, 2016, 10:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/22/technology/yahoo-databreach/?iid=EL.
10
Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Says Data Stolen from 1 Billion Accounts, CNN TECH
(Dec. 15, 2016, 4:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-breachbillion-users/index.html?iid=EL.
11
Mullen & Fiegerman, supra note 8.
12
Charles Arthur, Sony Suffers Second Data Breach with Theft of 25m More
User Details, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/tech
nology/blog/2011/may/03/sony-data-breach-online-entertainment.
13
Reed Abelson & Matthew Goldstein, Hackers Breached Data of Millions,
Insurer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at B1.
8
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“extramarital affairs website”;14 and (4) Target, which confirmed
on December 19, 2013, that credit and debit card information for
about forty million customers had been stolen.15
The illegal acquisition of consumer information on such a
wide scale can have major impacts on consumers.16 Generally,
consumers can only protect themselves from the potential
consequences of these hacks if they are promptly notified that
they have occurred. All fifty states require corporations to
comply with certain data security standards. For example, states
require that companies take certain steps to notify consumers in
the event that certain types of their stored data are accessed
without authorization.17 However, there is no federal statute
addressing the issue. The lack of a unified standard, as well as
the absence of certain forms of protections in these state statutes,
subject consumers to a greater risk of loss of their personal data’s
integrity than is necessary. In 2015, President Obama called on
Congress in his State of the Union address to pass cybersecurity
legislation because “we need to better meet the evolving threat of
cyber attacks, combat identity theft, and protect our children’s
information.”18 Several bills have been proposed in the last
several years, including the Data Security and Breach
Notification Act of 2015 (the “DSBNA” or “Act”). The bill was
sent to a Senate Committee twice, but never came to a vote and
was never ratified. The DSBNA sought to preempt the various
state laws on data breach notification in order to create a federal
standard for how and when corporations should notify consumers
in the event their data was accessed. It also dictated the extent
14
Robert Hackett, What To Know About the Ashley Madison Hack, FORTUNE
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/ashley-madison-hack/.
15
Rachel Abrams, Target To Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/
business/target-security-breach-settlement.html.
16
One vulnerability expert described the Equifax breach as “a Category 5
hurricane in the cyberworld,” whose “lasting impact . . . will go on for years.” Andrew
Soergel, Equifax Breach Could Have ‘Decades of Impact’, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/equifax-breachcould-have-decades-of-impact-on-consumers.
17
Data Breach Notification Laws: Now in All 50 States, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE (May 9, 2018), https://privacyrights.org/blog/data-breachnotification-laws-now-all-50-states.
18
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 20,
2015). See also Drew Amorosi, Obama Wants Federal Data Breach Notification Law,
DATACENTER DYNAMICS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/contenttracks/security-risk/obama-wants-federal-data-breach-notificationlaw/93420.fullarticle.
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of liability for failing to comply with the DSBNA’s mandates.
While the Act ultimately did not pass, it provides a framework,
along with state notification laws, that this Note will use to set
forth its arguments.
This Note argues that current law is inadequate to protect
consumers in light of the prevalence and severity of data
breaches in recent years, and that a unifying federal legislation
combining portions of state law and the DSBNA should be
enacted. Part I of this Note analyzes the DSBNA for notification
requirements when data breaches occur, the requirements for the
implementation of security policies, regulatory mechanisms for
monitoring compliance with these requirements, and criminal
penalties for failing to comply. Part II summarizes the various
state laws that exist for notification of data breaches. Part III
proposes a model federal statute that combines aspects of the
DSBNA with current state law. Specifically, Part III argues that
a preemption provision is important for creating a unified federal
standard, but that provision should create exceptions for robust
protections that consumers already enjoy under state law. It also
argues for the inclusion of a private right of action for consumers,
the removal of a reasonable risk of harm analysis, and a
provision that mandates cyber risk insurance for certain covered
entities.
I.

THE DATA SECURITY AND BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT OF 2015

The stated purpose of the DSBNA is “to provide for
nationwide notice in the event of a breach of security” and “[t]o
protect consumers by requiring reasonable security policies and
procedures to protect data concerning personal information.”19
The DSBNA requires the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to
promulgate regulations requiring commercial entities to
implement information security policies and procedures for the
treatment of personal information.20 It also sets out procedures
that must be complied with in the event of a data breach.21
Overall, the DSBNA goes too far in weakening consumer
protection that already exists for the sake of promoting unity.
This Part analyzes certain relevant provisions of the Act,
addressing: (1) the definitions of personal data; (2) when and in
19
See generally Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177,
114th Cong. (2015).
20
Id. § 2(a)(1).
21
See infra Parts I.B and I.C.
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what form notification is required to affected individuals, law
enforcement, and third parties; (3) the reasonable risk of harm
exemption for notification; (4) preemption; and (5) penalties for
noncompliance.
A.

Definitions of Important Terms in the DSBNA

The Act defines a data breach as a compromise of the
security or confidentiality of electronic data that results in—or
could reasonably be concluded to have resulted in—unauthorized
access to or acquisition of personal information from a covered
entity.22
Covered entities include “sole proprietorship[s],
partnership[s], corporation[s], trust[s], estate[s], cooperative[s],
association[s], or other commercial entit[ies], and any charitable,
educational, or nonprofit organization, that acquires, maintains,
or utilizes personal information.”23
Personal information is defined more broadly in the DSBNA
than it is in many, but not all, state statutes.24 Under the
DSBNA, personal information includes: (1) a non-truncated
social security number; (2) a financial account number or credit
or debit card number in combination with any security code,
access code, or password that is required for an individual to
obtain credit, withdraw funds, or engage in a financial
transaction; or (3) an individual’s first and last name or first
initial and last name in combination with (a) a driver’s license
number, a passport number, an alien registration number, or
other similar number on a government document used to verify
identity, (b) unique biometric data such as a fingerprint or voice
print, (c) a unique account identifier, electronic identification
number, user name, or routing code, in combination with an
access code or password, (d) or any two of the following: home
address or telephone number, mother’s maiden name, or month,
day, and year of birth.25 This broad definition offers strong
protections for consumers and triggers the notification
requirements more readily than the state statutes with more
restrictive definitions.26

22
23
24
25
26

S. 177 § 6(1)(A).
Id. § 6(3).
See discussion infra Part II.A.
S. 177 § 6(9).
See discussion infra Part II.A.
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B. Notification to Individuals and Law Enforcement
When a covered entity—an entity that owns or possesses
electronic data containing personal information—discovers a
breach of the security system containing that data, it must notify
several individuals and entities.27 First, the entity must notify
each individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States
and whose personal information is reasonably believed to have
been acquired as a result of the breach.28
Such notification shall be made within thirty days after the
date of discovery of a breach or:
as promptly as possible if the covered entity providing notice
can show that providing notice within [thirty days] is not
feasible due to circumstances necessary (A) to accurately
identify affected consumers; (B) to prevent further breach or
unauthorized disclosures; or (C) to reasonably restore the
integrity of the data system.29

The covered entity can provide notification in three ways:
(1) in writing; (2) by email if the entity’s primary means of
communication with an individual is by email or if the individual
has consented to receive communications by email; or (3) by any
means that can be reasonably expected to reach the individual.30
The notification must include several points of information to
comply with the requirements of the DSBNA. This includes:
(1) the date of the security breach; (2) a description of the
personal information that has been or is reasonably believed to
have been breached; (3) a telephone number that the customer
can use to contact the entity and inquire about the breach;
(4) notice that the individual may be entitled to consumer credit
reports under another section of the Act; (5) instructions on how
to receive those credit reports; (6) a telephone number and
address to contact each major credit reporting agency; and
finally, (7) a telephone number and a website to obtain
information regarding identity theft from the FTC.31
Under the DSBNA, the Secretary of Homeland Security
would be required to designate a federal government entity to
receive notice.32 A covered entity would be required to notify the
27
28
29
30
31
32

S. 177 § 3.
Id. § 3(a)(1).
Id. § 3(c)(1)–(2).
Id. § 3(d)(1)(A).
Id. § 3(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 4(a).
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designated government agency in several circumstances. First, if
the number of consumers whose personal information is
reasonably believed to have been acquired exceeds ten
thousand.33 Second, if the breach of security involves a database
containing the personal information of more than one million
individuals.34 Third, if the breach involves databases owned by
the federal government.35 Lastly, an entity must notify the
designated government agency if the breach of security involves
primarily personal information of individuals known to the
covered entity to be employees or contractors of the federal
government involved in national security or law enforcement.36
The DSBNA also details what must be included in the notice
to the designated federal agency. These requirements are the
same as the first three requirements of notice to individuals:
(1) the date of the security breach; (2) a description of the nature
of the breach of security; and (3) a description of each type of
information reasonably believed to have been acquired.37 Notice
must be delivered as soon as possible, but not less than three
business days before notification to an individual and not later
than ten days after the date of discovery of the breach.38
C. Reasonable Risk of Harm Exemption
Generally, an entity covered by the DSBNA is exempt from
the above notification requirements if the entity “reasonably
concludes” following a breach of security that there is no
reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful
conduct.39 The statute in fact provides a presumption that no
reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct
exists following a breach of security if “the data is rendered
unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through a security
technology or methodology,” such as encryption, and this
technology or methodology is generally accepted by experts in the
security field.40 This presumption can be rebutted by facts
demonstrating that the security technology or methodology in a

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. § 4(b)(1).
Id. § 4(b)(2).
Id. § 4(b)(3).
Id. § 4(b)(4).
Id. § 4(c)(1).
Id. § 4(e).
Id. § 3(g)(1).
Id. § 3(g)(2)(A).
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specific case is reasonably likely to be compromised.41 The
Commission is to meet within one year after enactment of the Act
to determine all relevant security technologies and methodologies
through consultation with relevant industries and consumer
organizations.42 The Commission is then to determine which
technologies and methodologies, when in use, comply with the
dictates of the presumption.43 The rules imply that entities
should presume a notification requirement, unless this
presumption is rebutted by a showing that there is no reasonable
risk of harm to consumers.44
Arguably, requiring notification even when there has not
been, or does not appear to be, any risk of actual harm would
lead to over-notification.45 Over-notification would increase the
costs to entities by forcing them to comply with broad notification
requirements, as well as by increasing the intangible costs that
would be incurred through reputational damage and reduced
consumer loyalty.46 However, these potential costs will further
incentivize covered entities to maintain strong cybersecurity
policies and to keep up with innovations in that industry.
Preferably, entities would employ policies that limit their
exposure to potential breaches to the technologically possible
minimum. Finding a statutory way of encouraging entities to be
that thorough, proactive, and consumer-oriented in their
approach is preferable to a lesser standard that merely lists some
bare minimum requirements entities must comply with after a
breach has already occurred.
D. Penalties and Preemption
The DSBNA does not provide a private right of action for
individuals to bring suit to enforce its provisions. Instead, if the
attorney general of a state “has reason to believe that an interest
of the residents of that State has been or is threatened or
adversely affected by any covered entity who violates” the
41

Id. § 3(g)(2)(B).
Id. § 3(g)(3).
43
Id.
44
Patricia Bailin, Examining the President’s Proposed National Data Breach
Notification Standard Against Existing Legislation, IAPP (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://iapp.org/news/a/examining-the-presidents-proposed-national-data-breachnotification-standard-against-existing-legislation/#.
45
Jacqueline May Tom, Note, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal
Data Breach Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1569, 1577–78 (2010).
46
Id. at 1571.
42
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notification requirements of the DSBNA, he may bring a civil
action on behalf of the residents of that state.47 The action may
seek to enjoin further violation by the defendant, compel
compliance with the DSBNA, or obtain civil penalties.48
Damages are calculated by multiplying the days of
noncompliance or the number of violations by an amount not
greater than $11,000.49 Each failure to notify a resident is
considered a separate violation of the law.50 The DSBNA caps
the potential liability a defendant can face at $5,000,000 for each
violation of a requirement to notify law enforcement and
$5,000,000 for all violations of the requirements to notify
individuals.51
Additionally, an attorney general can bring an action against
a covered entity for violation of the requirements of notice to law
enforcement agencies as well.52 In such actions, the burden of
proof is a preponderance of the evidence; once met, an entity is
subject to a maximum penalty of $1,000 per individual.53 This
penalty is capped at $100,000 per day until the violation has
been remedied.54 The total amount of civil penalties that can be
imposed in such a situation is $1,000,000, except where the
infraction was willful or intentional.55 In that case, an additional
civil penalty of $1,000,000 can be imposed on the violating
entity.56 An attorney general can also petition a United States
district court for an order enjoining an entity from engaging in
any act or practice that appears to violate the notification
requirements of § 4.57
The DSBNA also imposes liability on persons who have
knowledge of a breach of security requiring notification under the
Act and intentionally and willfully conceal that knowledge, if the

47

S. 177, 114th Cong. § 5(d)(1) (2015).
Id.
49
Id. § 5(d)(2)(A)(i).
50
Id. § 5(d)(2)(A)(ii) (“Each failure to send notification . . . to a resident of the
State shall be treated as a separate violation.”).
51
Id. § 5(d)(2)(C).
52
Id. § 5(e)(1).
53
Id. § 5(e)(2)(A).
54
Id.
55
Id. § 5(e)(2)(B).
56
Id.
57
Id. § 5(e)(3).
48
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breach “results in economic harm to any individual in the
amount of $1,000 or more.”58 Such persons can be subject to a
civil fine, imprisonment for up to five years, or both.59
The most problematic aspect of the DSBNA is that it
contains a broad preemption provision. It states that no persons
other than those specified above may bring a civil action under
the laws of any state if such action is premised on a violation of
the Act.60 This means that private individuals cannot bring state
common law causes of action for the behavior of entities that
amounts to a violation of the DSBNA. The Act also supersedes
“any provision of a statute, regulation, or rule of a State . . . that
expressly . . . requires notification to individuals of a breach of
security,” with respect to covered entities under the DSBNA.61
However, an entity is not exempt from actions sounding in
common law, such as tort, under the Act.62 As discussed below,
the protections provided for in state statutes are often more
consumer-oriented than protections in the DSBNA.63 Analogous
state laws requiring notification to individuals would no longer
be effective if the Act was enacted as is. Enacting a federal
standard with a preemption provision as broad as the one
proposed in the DSBNA would have far-reaching consequences
for consumers, effectively weakening their protection.64
II. COMPARING STATE DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
The need for a unified federal standard and what should be
included in that standard can only be determined by analyzing
what protections have already been put in place by state law. As
such, much like the analysis of the Act above, several categories
of these laws will be examined in turn: (1) the various definitions
of personal data; (2) when, in what form, and to whom
notification is required; (3) the reasonable risk of harm exception;
and (4) penalties for noncompliance.

58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. § 1041(a).
Id. § 1041(a).
Id. § 7(b)(1).
Id. § 7(a)(1).
Id. § 7(c)(1)–(2).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
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Covered Entities and Definitions of Personal Data

Generally, under analogous state statutes, entities that
conduct business in the state and that maintain computerized
records of personal information are covered.65
Most state
notification statutes also require the cooperation of service
providers.66 There are some limited exceptions. For example,
Minnesota’s statute does not cover financial institutions, whereas
the DSBNA does.67 Additionally, Maine carves out an exception
for governmental agencies that maintain records primarily for
traffic safety, law enforcement, and licensing purposes.68
The definitions of personal data also vary across state
notification statutes. For example, Colorado’s recently amended
statute, effective September 1, 2018, defines personal data as a
“Colorado resident’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any” of the following unencrypted elements:
(1) social security number; (2) student, military, or passport
identification
number;
(3) driver’s
license
number
or
identification card number; (4) medical information; (5) health
insurance identification number; (6) or biometric data.69
Colorado’s definition of personal information also includes an
account or credit card number in combination with any required
code that would allow access to the account, or a username or
email address with a password or security question answer that
would allow access.70 This definition evinces a movement to
protect broader categories of personal data.
Most state
definitions include subsets of what is included in Colorado’s
amended statute. The DSBNA is less broad and does not include
medical history or an individual’s health insurance policy
number, for example.71 Some states do not include specific
categories of data like health and medical data but do include
catch-all terms like “[u]nique electronic identifier,” along with
the security information necessary to access the account.72 As

65
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(A) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a701b(b)(1) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. § 14-3504(b)(1) (West 2018).
66
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2)(b) (West 2018).
67
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(4) (West 2018) (providing an exemption to
financial institutions).
68
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(3) (2017).
69
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(1)(g)(I)(A).
70
Id. § 6-1-716(1)(g)(I)(B)–(C).
71
S. 177, 114th Cong. § 6(9) (2015).
72
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1(11)(a)(4) (West 2018).
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our notions of what is considered personal data worthy of
protection and privacy expand, that should be reflected in a
unified federal statute.
B. Who, When, and How: Notification Requirements
State notification statutes vary as far as to whom they
require notice be given. As you would expect, every state
provides that notice must be provided to the affected individual
when the notification requirement is triggered.73 A significant
portion of states require that this notice also be given to the state
attorney general.74 Further, some statutes require notice to
consumer reporting agencies as well.75
State law varies as to how long entities have to notify the
required individuals and entities. Most states require that notice
be given “in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay.”76 Some states provide upper limits on what
is expedient and reasonable. 77
Entities can employ several means to notify individuals of
data breaches. In New York, notice can be provided in writing,
electronically if the person to whom notice is being sent has
consented, or via telephone.78 If a business in New York
demonstrates to the attorney general that the cost of notice
would exceed $250,000, then substitute notice is available.79
Substitute notice must consist of an email, “[c]onspicuous posting
of the notice on the website page of the covered entity if the
covered entity maintains one,” and “[n]otification to major
73

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 3(b) (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 87-803(1) (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2) (McKinney 2018).
74
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.604(1)(b) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2435(b)(3)(C)(i) (West 2018).
75
E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20(VI)(a) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-65(f) (West 2018).
76
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(1)(a)
(West 2018); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72(12)(4) (West 2018) (“A person
or agency shall provide any notice required under this section without unreasonable
delay.”).
77
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(4)(a) (West 2018) (“Notice to individuals shall be
made as expeditiously as practicable . . . but no later than 30 days.”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1349.19(B)(2) (West 2018) (provides a forty-five-day time limit to
provide notice); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(b)(1) (also provides a forty-five-day time
limit); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(16) (West 2018) (forty-five-day time
limit).
78
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(5)(a)–(c).
79
Id. § 899-aa(5)(d). Colorado provides the same threshold cost for substitute
notice availability. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(1)(f)(IV) (West 2018).
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statewide media.”80 Maine allows for substitute notice if an
entity demonstrates that the cost of providing notice would
exceed merely $5,000, if the affected class of individuals exceeds
one thousand persons, or if the entity does not have sufficient
contact information to provide written or electronic notice.81
Some states do not explicitly delineate what must be
included in a notice given to consumers. Other states require
specific pieces of information in the notice and provide guidelines
on how the language of the notice should be written. For
example, Washington provides that the notice of the breach must
be written in plain language, and include at the minimum:
(i) The name and contact information of the reporting person or
business subject to this section; (ii) A list of the types of
personal information that were or are reasonably believed to
have been the subject of a breach; and (iii) The toll-free
telephone numbers and addresses of the major credit reporting
agencies if the breach exposed personal information.82

Virginia also provides that the notice must include “[t]he
general acts of the [business] to protect the personal information
from further unauthorized access [or acquisition]” and “[a]dvice
that directs the [consumer] to remain vigilant by reviewing
account statements and monitoring free credit reports.”83 And
Colorado requires contact information for the FTC in addition to
reporting agencies.84
C. What Triggers Notification
Similar to the DSBNA, some state laws provide that
notification is not required if, after an appropriate investigation,
identity theft or other fraud to any consumer is not reasonably
likely to occur as a result of a breach.85 New York’s statute lists
criteria that entities can consult when analyzing the risk of harm
resulting from a breach, and that courts can consider when

80

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(1)(f)(IV).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(4)(C) (2017). Kansas allows for substitute
notice when the cost of providing notice will exceed $100,000 or the affected class of
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determining if an entity’s conclusion was reasonable.86 However,
some states explicitly provide that notification is required even if
a covered entity determines that there is no reasonable risk of
harm.87 For example, California, the first state to enact a data
breach notification statute, requires notification in the event of
any unauthorized acquisition of data.88
D. Penalties
Finally, states are split as to whether a private right of
action exists in the event of a data breach. The majority of states
have decided that an individual should not have a private right of
action. However, states such as Hawaii, Louisiana, and Nevada
are exceptions.89 Most states simply allow the state attorney
general to bring an action on behalf of affected consumers.90
There are very few states that provide for criminal penalties in
the event of a violation of their statutes; for example, Michigan
makes it a misdemeanor to notify consumers that a breach
occurred when it did not.91 Through criminal penalties, the
DSBNA provides a strong incentive to comply that is absent from
most state laws.
III. A HYBRID OF STATE LAW AND THE DATA SECURITY AND
BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT
The diversity among the state data security laws is confusing
and increases compliance costs for corporations. A unified
federal standard has the potential not only to make it easier for
entities to comply with statutory requirements, but also to
increase consumer protection in the wake of a steady stream of
cyber threats. However, the DSBNA, as written, is unable to

86
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(c) (McKinney 2018) (The criteria are
“(1) indications that the information is in the physical possession and control of an
unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device containing
information; or (2) indications that the information has been downloaded or copied;
or (3) indications that the information was used by an unauthorized person, such as
fraudulent accounts opened or instances of identity theft reported.”).
87
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018).
88
Id.; see Tom, supra note 45, at 1577.
89
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-3(b) (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075
(2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.270 (West 2017) (applies only to data collectors,
not consumers).
90
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(L) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107
(West 2018).
91
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72(12)(12) (West 2018).
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fulfill these goals for a variety of reasons. Instead, a model
federal standard that adopts portions of both the DSBNA and
current state laws would be more effective.
Five points are necessary to a successful federal statute.
First, the statute must include a preemption provision that
increases the strength of protections in jurisdictions with the
weakest laws without diluting the protections in jurisdictions
whose statutes are more consumer-oriented. Second, a federal
standard must include a private right of action as a necessary
remedy for individuals to assert and protect their rights, and to
incentivize entities to enact strong security policies while
complying with strict notification requirements. Third, entities
should be required to notify individuals without unreasonable
delay, as this standard allows for flexibility without posing
danger to consumers from undue delay. Fourth, consumers
should be notified in the event of any breach, without exceptions
for a reasonable risk of harm analysis. Lastly, a federal standard
should include incentives for covered entities to maintain
cybersecurity insurance as both a protection for themselves as
well as for consumers by extension.
A.

A Model Federal Data Security and Breach Notification
Statute Must Contain a Narrower Preemption Provision
than the DSBNA

Even though a unified federal standard is desirable, the
preemption language of the DSBNA actually weakens consumer
protection for the sake of that unity. The DSBNA would preempt
current state data breach notification laws in several different
areas.92 Currently, some state statutes already offer stronger
data privacy protection and notification than would be provided
for in the DSBNA. Those protections should not be preempted,
and any federal standard should find a way to accommodate
those adequate safeguards.
As a result of the diversity of data breach notification
statutes across the country, many businesses that operate
interstate tend to follow certain aspects of the strictest state laws

92
Bailin, supra note 44 (The Act “contains a preemption provision to ensure the
bill will ‘supersede any provision of the law of any State, or political subdivision
thereof, relating to notification by a business entity engaged in interstate commerce
of a security breach of computerized data.’ ”).
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for the sake of simplicity.93 This means that many consumers
have been protected by the requirements of the strictest state
breach notification statutes in the country for certain aspects of
data notification law. However, even though this has led to a
partial and informal unity in an otherwise chaotic area of law, it
is far less reliable than the consistent, statutorily required unity
that would result from a federal statute. Further, whatever that
federal standard turns out to be, if it preempts the strictest state
statutes and imposes a less demanding standard, it will weaken
some of the protections that consumers have enjoyed.94
If the DSBNA were the enacted federal standard, there are
several categories of personal information protected in state
statutes that would be preempted. For example, an industry has
emerged around the collection and handling of consumers’ health
and fitness data through websites, apps, and wearable devices.95
This type of information is not covered by the definition of
personal information in the DSBNA, and any state law providing
notification requirements for a breach of this category of data
would no longer be in effect.96 A few state laws even still include
information in paper or other analog formats within their
definitions of personal data.97
Some advocates have also warned that the preemption
language of the DSBNA could prevent local governments from
developing non-breach related data security rules.98 It has been
further suggested that, while the DSBNA itself does not propose
preempting data breach regulations put in place by the Federal
Communications Provision, the broad language in its preemption
provision suggests that other bills that make their way to
Congress might.99 Interstate corporations trying to manage their
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compliance costs need clarity on what combinations of illegally
acquired data amount to a breach triggering notification.
However, preempting entire categories of data that states
explicitly chose to include in their legislation sacrifices the
interests of consumers for the interests of large-scale
sophisticated businesses. These businesses willfully assumed the
responsibility of safely storing that information, and their
interests should not be put ahead of the interests of consumers.
Amending the definition of personal data in the DSBNA to
reflect the broadest definition in a state statute, thereby
including health and medical data, analog formats, etc. would
extend notification requirements and the increased protection
those requirements provide. But that approach, while helpful, is
not a long-term or comprehensive solution. Our perceptions of
what constitutes personal data can change, as can hackers’
ability to exploit pieces of information for their benefit. It would
be more efficient and require less piecemeal post-hoc amending of
the federal statute if it contained a modified preemption
provision that does not negate the enforceability of state statutes
that contain stricter provisions or broader definitions affording
greater consumer protection. A preemption provision structured
as such also allows states to expand protection for their
constituents as technology evolves, without forcing consumers to
wait for the glacially paced federal legislature to address new
issues.
One possible way to structure a federal preemption statute is
to ensure that it only preempts state laws that address the same
areas that the federal law does. The preemption clause could
also be “further narrowed to resemble the preemption standard
under” a federal statutory scheme such as HITECH, “which
creates a floor for data protection, rather than a ceiling.”100
Creating a floor would allow states to provide the strictest
protection that their respective legislatures believe is necessary
to protect their constituencies, while a unified floor would make
it somewhat easier for interstate corporations to comply.
Admittedly, this floor should resemble some of the highest
protections currently created in state statutes.
Interstate
entities would likely still have to tailor their practices to the
strictest protections provided for in the states in which they
operate as they currently do, but only in those states. Many
100
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intrastate entities would now be required to comply with
notification requirements stricter than those they have dealt
with in the past.
Unlike the DSBNA, state laws can contain specific security
standards or practices that entities must comply with, whereas
the DSBNA tasks the FTC with creating and promulgating those
specific regulations.101 Again, a broad preemption provision
would overrule these specific state requirements and entities
would only have to comply with the procedures promulgated by
the FTC.102 The effect this would have depends in large part on
what the FTC decides to do. At the very least, states should be
allowed to prescribe stricter procedures and policies for
corporations to follow for the protection of their residents’ data.
B. A Private Right of Action Should Be Included
Another necessary aspect of a model federal standard is a
private right of action. Some state laws already provide for a
private right of action. A federal standard that preempts these
would eliminate a protection already in place for individuals in
those jurisdictions.103 After Sony’s online network was breached,
it faced fifty-five different class actions alleging negligence and
breach of privacy.104 Sony decided to settle at least several of
these class actions.105 This is just one example of how consumers
may rely on private rights of action to protect or vindicate their
interests in the event of a large-scale breach of private
information. A private right of action should be available to the
individuals residing in all states and territories; this can only be
achieved through federal legislation.
Currently, circuit courts are split regarding what constitutes
standing in a data breach lawsuit.106 In Pisciotta v. Old National
Bancorp, class action plaintiffs sought damages for the costs of
101
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credit-monitoring services as well as negligence for a breach of
their personal information.107 The Seventh Circuit held that
“[w]ithout more than allegations of increased risk of future
identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that the
law is prepared to remedy.”108 Even though the applicable
Indiana law provided for a private right of action, the court
determined that it was not intended for individuals to recover on
such a theory.109 However, in the D.C. Circuit, when insured
persons brought a class action against a health insurer after
their personal information was stolen during a data breach, the
court held that the plaintiffs did indeed have standing.110
Some might argue that a private right of action does not
need to be included in a federal standard because any preemption
provisions, similar to the one proposed in the DSBNA, do not
preempt common law rights of action. However, it is still unclear
if individuals even have common law remedies for pursuing
individual litigation due to this standing issue. Including a
private right of action when entities fail to comply with
notification requirements provides a remedy for individuals who
face costs when their personal data is exposed. Some argue that
a future risk of identity theft is not a cognizable injury and does
not provide an individual the right to recover. However, that
response ignores the reality consumers face and does nothing to
help consumers who are exposed to greater financial risk because
an entity failed to comply with notification requirements. It
gives consumers two poor options. First, they can unfairly
assume the costs of preemptive measures themselves. Second,
they can wait until the risk of identity theft has been actualized
to bring suit and suffer enduring and sometimes catastrophic
consequences.
Including a private right of action would encourage entities
to implement extensive cyber risk related security policies.111
Private rights of action are “an important incentive to companies
to ensure that personal data sets are protected.”112 In an action
brought pursuant to a private right of action for failure to notify,
“plaintiffs [would be] required to show more likely than not that
107
108
109
110
111
112
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the breach—the failure to notify—caused the plaintiff’s injuries,”
which would “place[] an extremely heavy burden on the
plaintiff.”113 Allowing individuals to bring suit simply for the
failure to notify, without actual identity theft, gives persons a
means to obtain the funds necessary to protect themselves from
the potential future injury, a relatively small amount of money
for a large corporation. In the event that an individual is
actually injured, the high burden placed on the individual would
limit the liability corporations face from individuals for their
failure to comply.114 Corporations would only pay large damages
if their negligence truly resulted in large injuries to these
individuals. This would prevent the combination of statutorily
imposed penalties and individual damages awards from resulting
in excessive liability for a single breach. Under the proposed
standard, plaintiffs would only be able to successfully plead their
case where there is sufficient evidence that an entity’s noncompliance played a substantial role in the ensuing injury.
However, civil penalties in a federal data breach notification
law should be uncapped. The DSBNA imposes no upper limit on
how much an entity can be assessed for multiple security
breaches and imposes a harsh penalty on entities that willfully or
intentionally fail to comply with its requirements.115 On the one
hand, this could lead to incredibly substantial liability for
corporations stemming from a single data breach. However, this
additional penalty is only imposed for willful failure to comply
with the notification requirements, not for the injuries sustained
by individuals resulting from a breach.116 Harsh penalties
without any upper limit provide a strong incentive for covered
entities to comply. As such, uncapped civil penalties, as provided
for in the DSBNA, should be included in a model federal
standard.
A federal standard must also make it clear that when the
government collects civil penalties on behalf of his residents, the
residents receive the reimbursement. If individuals are not
reimbursed when an action is brought on their behalf, they either
receive no remedy for the breach or are forced to bring another
action for the same breach themselves. While damages provide a
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strong incentive for entities to comply with the law after a
breach, they do not make consumers whole again unless the
funds end up in the pockets of affected individuals.
C. The Standard of Notification Without Unreasonable Delay Is
the Better Standard
A federal law should provide that when notification is
triggered, entities must notify individuals without unreasonable
delay. The DSBNA and a minority of states require that
notification be given to individuals without unreasonable delay
but with an upper limit.117 This alternative is not the best
solution. Capping how long entities have to notify individuals
would likely incentivize them to notify individuals quicker than
they otherwise would. But, bright line rules are inflexible. A
federal statute should require entities to notify individuals in the
most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay,
similar to most state statutes.118 Additionally, an upper limit
may do more harm than good. There may be situations where an
entity has the means to notify individuals in much less time than
the commonly required thirty days. Including an upper limit on
what can be considered “without undue delay” can actually give
entities a “cushion to delay notification[].”119 Some businesses
argue that thirty days is too short of a window to assess the
extent of and respond to a data breach.120 In that event, when
that claim is true and stands up to scrutiny from federal
agencies, a more flexible window would allow entities to delay
notification until it would be more proper. As long as it is
objectively reasonable that the entities take that much time, it
would be fairer to allow them to do so. The uncapped standard
provides flexibility to deal with the exigencies of each
individualized situation and is the preferable standard for a
federal data breach notification law.
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D. The Reasonable Risk of Harm Analysis
A federal law should not include a reasonable risk of harm
exemption from notification requirements. The exemption may
help corporations whose data has been breached avoid greater
costs, but it ignores the rights of individuals to know when their
data has been accessed. If an individual wants to preemptively
take steps to avoid potential identity theft, it is vital that they
know when their personal data has been accessed. “[A] consumer
can only have control over his personal information if he knows
who is in possession of it; therefore, increased control requires
increased disclosure.”121
The idea that individuals have
ownership of their personal data, even after placing it in the
hands of entities, is expanding and strengthening.122 Even if
there is no substantial risk of harm, the risk an individual is
subjected to after their personal data has been compromised is
never fully mitigated. A person should have the opportunity to
take steps to protect themselves, even if they are being overly
cautious.
Additionally, placing an unfettered notification
requirement on covered entities provides them with still greater
incentive to protect personal data above and beyond that
provided by strict penalties. Entities will want to avoid the
reputational harm that would result from frequent data breach
disclosures. At the very least, individuals deserve to know what
is happening with their data, something that ultimately belongs
to them and them alone.
It should be noted that the “risk of harm analysis may keep
some companies from having to undertake costly notice
requirements, [but] this may not be fiscally responsible for a
covered entity.”123 If a breach becomes public after an entity
determines that notice is not required, “a determination that the
notification requirement was not met could end up costing huge
amounts of resources in litigation costs, not to mention the
negative publicity that may harm business interests, irrespective
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of legal requirements.”124 As such, there are instances where a
reasonable risk of harm analysis works against the best interests
of an entity under a compliance cost analysis.
E. Cyber Risk-Related Insurance Should Be Encouraged in a
Model Federal Statute
Cyber risk-related insurance would make it easier for
entities whose data has been breached to compensate affected
individuals. A model federal standard should include provisions
that strongly encourage covered entities to maintain such
policies. When Sony was hacked and the financial data for
millions of consumers was stolen, Sony’s potential liability was in
the tens of billions of dollars.125 Unfortunately for Sony, its
insurer claimed that Sony’s insurance policy did not cover cyberrelated third party claims.126 Costs resulting from a data breach
can include investigating and repairing damages, notifying
individuals and state agencies of the occurrence—as would be
mandated by this Note’s proposed standard—and managing
public relations and reputational harm.127 It is imperative that
the entities covered by the proposed federal standard pursue
cyber risk-related insurance policies, “which have become
increasingly available over the past decade.”128
One commentator notes that a way that the federal
government can encourage companies to obtain cyber risk
insurance is to mandate that government contractors and subcontractors maintain such policies.129 Doing so “might indirectly
influence more businesses in the private industry to follow their
competitors’ lead.”130 Also, if a model statute included a private
right of action to bring suit against entities whose data was
breached, it would encourage companies to seek cyber risk
insurance to protect themselves from potentially massive
liability. “Cyber policies themselves impose requirements on
businesses that must be met to ensure coverage, which can also
help protect from a breach occurring in the first place.”131
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Without maintaining insurance, the costs of statutory penalties,
private rights of action, and practical costs for dealing with a
breach could become debilitating. This would not be beneficial
for the economy or consumers. Consumers still want to use the
services provided by these entities; they just want to be able to do
so without subjecting themselves to a substantial risk of identity
theft.
CONCLUSION
The Data Security and Breach Notification Act is
comprehensive legislation that expands the scope of protection
under state law in many areas. However, its broad preemption
provision dilutes protections that consumers have grown
accustomed to through state laws, far too extensively to be
enacted as is. A model federal standard must contain a modified
preemption provision that allows states the flexibility to
maintain their own, more stringent standards and to adapt them
as they see fit. The standard must also provide a private right of
action because class actions act as an important mechanism for
redressing individual wrongs, providing financial incentive to
covered entities to adequately protect consumer data, and
encouraging entities to enthusiastically comply with notification
requirements to avoid both statutory penalties and litigation
damages. There is no indication that the number of cyber attackrelated data breaches is going to decrease anytime soon. The
federal law proposed in this Note is the best way to create some
semblance of unity in this field while increasing protection for
consumers and maintaining state autonomy to legislate in this
area.

